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STUDENT NOTES AND COMMENTS
CONFLICT OF LAWS-SECURING

SERVICE ON CORPORATIONS
It is well established that a state has jurisdiction over a
corporation present within the state. The problem herein to be
considered is one of determining what constitutes presence sufficient for obtaining jurisdiction, and for this purpose certain
tests have come to be accepted as controlling.
Domestic Corporations. A corporation may be sued in the
state of its incorporation although its business may be in favt
carried on elsewhere,' the theory being that a corporation is
domiciled in the state in which it is chartered and can be said
to be sufficiently present there at all times as to be amenablh
to service. 2 Personal service on its principal officer would
always be valid while a statute providing for something less
than personal service would be equally valid subject to the condition that the method is one reasonably calculated to give notive
of the suit and opportunity to defend. 3
Foreign Corporations. The problem of presence within the
state for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction is limited largely,
if not entirely, to cases in which a corporation is being sued in a
state other than the one of its incorporation. The following"
situations are said to give jurisdiction over a foreign coprration:
(a) Appearance or brbging of suit. In a companion note,'
the writer has discussed appearance as a basis for jurisdiction in
the case of an individual. It is enough to say that the same
rules apply to appearance by corporations. Likewise, a foreign
corporation, by becoming a plaintiff in a cause of action, subjects itself to the jurisdiction of the court to the same extent as a
natural person under similar circumstances.:,
(b) Cozsent. There is no longer any doubt that a state may
impose reasonable requirements upon a foreign corporation as a
condition to the granting of permission to do business within its
IRESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) See. 87.
2 STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d Ed. 1937) p. 81.
3 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) Sec. 87,

'Note (1945) 33 Ky. L. J.
5Ibid.

comments 2, b.
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borders." One of the most common of these requirements is that
the corporation must appoint an agent to receive service. By
app,,inting- such an agent, the corporation is said to have con7
sented to the jurisdiction of the state. The question becomes:
Is the consent limited to causes of action arising out of business
dlone within the state or does it extend to transitory causes of
;wtion as well ? In Pcimzsylania Fire Insurance Company v.
(,id Is.tr Minib and Milling Co.sN a fire insurance company
tiled with the State of Missouri a power of attorney making the
Superintendent of the Insurance Department its agent to receive
servive. The state court held that this constituted consent to suit
on a transitory cause of action and the holding was affirmed by
the United States Supreme Court in an opinion written by
Justice Holmes. Juri-diction was said to rest on consent, arising
out of th power of attorney filed with the state.
The statute frequently provides that, (if the corporation
does not appoint an agent), service may be on some state official
such as the Secretary of State in suits growing out of business
,lone within the state. Although the corporation cannot be said
to have consented in fact, it is frequently said that it has given
its implied consent by coming in and doing business. This, however, seems strained. Is it not better to say that the foreign
v'orpration, by comiing in and doing business, is present so that
it can be subjected to jurisdiction just as a person actually
present .an be subjected? This theory makes presence the test.
As in the case of an individual, the foreign corporation may be
served if present in the state and it is present in the state if it is
doing bu,--iness there. There are isolated caseso indicating that
the same result could be obtained in absence of statute and ProOn the other hand.
fessor Scott believes that this is sound.1
1
there is no doubt that statutes of this type are valid, provided
"Atlantic Refining Co. v. Virginia, 302 U. S. 26 (1937); Railway
Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 282 U. S. 440 (1931); Lafayette

Insurance Company v. French, 18 How. 404 (1858).

RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) See. 91, comment a.
'243 U. S.93 (1917).
"Wilson Packing Co. v. Hunter, 30 Fed. Cas. 253, No. 17,852
1879); see Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane, 170 U. S. 100 at
(S. D. Ill.
108 (1898).
' Scott, Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents Doina Business within a
State (1919) 32 HARV. L. R. 871.
"American Railway Express Co. v. Royster Guano Co., 273
U. S.274 (1927).
L. J.--4
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that the requirements of due process are satisfied. Service upon
a state official, if the cause of action arises out of the business
done within the state, 12 has been held to satify this requirement.
It is well settled, however, that such procedure is not sufficient
as to transitory causes of action, a distinction made by Justice
Holmes in the decision mentioned above. 13 If the corporation is
actually within the state and doing business there, it may be
queried whether the distinction rest on any sound rationalization.
A statute in the state of Washington provided that if the
corporation's agent was no longer within the state, service could
be had upon the Secretary of State but no provision was made
for notice to be given to the corporation of the suit against it.
The United States Supreme Court, in Washbigtoni v. itpcrior
Court, Etc.,'4 approved a state [Washington] decision based on
this statute, holding that service on the Secretary of State subjected the corporation to jurisdiction even though the corporation had been dissolved, had withdrawn from the state and its
agent had moved to California, and no attempt was made by the
Secretary to notify the corporation of the suit. Justice Roberts.
speaking for the court, justified the decision as necessary to protect persons who had done business with the corporation and said
that the corporation could have protected itself by appointing a
new agent. This decision is open to criticism in that it apparently dispenses with the usual requirement that service be of
such a nature that it is reasonably calculated to give uiotice to the
defendant and to give him opportunity to be heard. Justice
Roberts recognized that this requirement exists in the case of
individuals but said that the power of the state to exclude a corporation distinguished the corporation cases.

This is in seeming

contradiction to the general rule that a corporation, just as an
individual, cannot be deprived of its property without due process of law.'3 The fact that the corporation could have protected
itself is no answer to the argument that such a statute, in failing
12-Ibid., RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) Sec. 92, comment a.
" See Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. v. Gold Issue Mining and
Milling Co., 243 U. S. 93 at 96 (1917).
"289 U. S. 361 (1933).
" Riverside and Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menneffee, 237 U. S.
189 (1915).
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to require notice, violated the due process clause of the Con-

stitutioln.
Doinig Buisi.es. Within the aSta.e. In addition to the statiite which make a state official an agent to receive service if the
cmporation

comes in and does business and does not appoint an

ag'nt, a state may by statute provide that if a foreign corpora-

tion is doing business within the state, it is subject to service. 16
Various theories have been su'gested in support of the validity
of this rule, none of which is entirely satisfactory to Stumberg. T7
It is hi.- contention that the best explanation is "...
that it
would be unfair to the plaintiff to compel him to go to another
jitrisdiction to sue when the cause of action . . . arises out of
business done there [in the state] . . .i,,
The writer prefers
to express the same idea in terms of the presence theory discussed
above. It would seem that if a corporation has come into the
state and is doing business there, it is present, and, being present, it is reasonable to make it subject to jurisdiction and, contrariwise, it would be unreasonable to allow it to avoid jurisdiction by failing to appoint an agent.
While the rule is well enough settled, the difficulty lies in
determining what constitutes "doing business" so that the rule
applies. The New York court has said that there is no precise
test either as to the nature or extent of the business that must
be done.'"' It must be enough to enable the court to say that the
corporation is present for if it is present, it may be served.
Whether a corporation is doing business sufficient for jurisdiction to attach is, in the last analysis, a question of due process of
law under the federal Constitution. - o For if it was never present
within the state it ?annot be served, and a personal judgment
agaii.st it would deprive it of property without due process of
law.
Though each ease must be decided on its own facts there are
certain tests that have been laid down, chiefly negative in charatter. For instance, a single transaction is not sufficient to conTauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N. Y. 259, 11.5 N. E. 915
(1917).
"STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d Ed., 1927) pp. 89, 90.
Ibid. at 91.
'"Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N. Y. 259. 115 N. E. 915
(1917).
- Hall v. Wilder Manufacturing Co., 316 Mo. 812, 293 S. W. 760
(1927).
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stitute "doing business." '21 The corporation must be 'there
". .. not occasionally or casually but with a fair measure of
On the other hand. the
",22
permanence and continuity
business need not be of a sufficient degree or the particular quality that would require it to get a permit to do business or to
23
While some courts
allow it to sue in the courts of the state.
business, "24
"doing
not
is
orders
of
solicitation
that
held
have
others have adopted the seemingly better view that continuou.
solicitation is sufficient to constitute doing business so that jurisdiction can be secured.2 5 The courts have held consistently that
service on an official of a subsidiary company, though the subsidiary is completely dominated by the parent company,
is not sufficient for obtaining jurisdictio .2"-1 The distinct
corporate entity of the subsidiary is emphasized but it can be
argued that the susidiary is doing business for the benefit of the
parent company and service on the proper official is reasonably
calculated to give notice to the parent company.
A comparison of the facts in the following cases will
indicate the difficulty of stating with any degree of exactitude
the test of what constitutes doing business. In Tautqa v. 8ii.qi,(hanna Coal Co.,27 a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal
office in Philadelphia but with a branch office in New York was
sued in New York. The branch office consisted of a sales agent
with eight assistants but all sales were subject to confirmation by
the home office so that the agents were merely soliciting orders
and the contracts were formed in Pennsylvania. The New York
court held that the corporation was amenable to service. The
acts done were said to be sufficient to enable the court to say
"Hutchinson et al. v. Chase and Gilbert, Inc., 45 F. (2d) 139
(C. C. A. 2d, 1930).
2Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N. Y. 259, 115 N. E. 915
(1917).
' International Text-Book Co. v. Tone, 220 N. Y. 313, 115 N. E.
914 (1917).
'Peoples Tobacco Co., Limited v. American Tobacco Co., 246
U. S. 79 (1918); Davega, Inc. v. Lincoln Furniture Manufacturing
Co., Inc., 29 F. (2d) 164 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928).
International Text-Book Co. v. Tone, 220 N. Y. 313, 115 N. E.
914 (1917); Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N. Y. 259, 115 N. E.
915 (1917).
" Canon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U. S.
333 (1925); Peoples Tobacco Co., Limited v. American Tobacco Co.,
246 U. S_ 79 (1918).
-220 N. Y. 259, 115 N. E.915 (1917).

STUDENT NOTES

that the corporation was present and therefore within the jurisdii-tion of the courts.
The defendant in Hitchison et al. v. Chase and Gilbert
ct aV 1 was a Massachusetts corporation which maintained a small
office in New York with a small bank account also in New York
for the use of this office. On occasion, the directors met there.
Stocks had been sold and advertising material was sent out from
New York. The contract on which the suit was brought was
made in New York but a federal court held that the corporation
was not subject to the jurisdiction of the New York courts, saying- that there must be some continuous dealings in the state and
that it was fairer that the plaintiff should go to Boston. The
,-orl oration apparently considered its business sufficiently continuous to warrant maintaining an office in New York at all
times. And when it is remembered that the contract sued on
was made in the state, the facts in this case may well be regarded
as stron!ger than those in the Taitza case. As one court expressed
it, if the corporation does business " . . . under the protection
(if the laws ... it ought to be liable to the burdens as well as the
benefits of the laws.''"
In a case in a federal district court in Pennsylvania a railroad had a passenger and freight agent in Philadelphia whose
business it was to solicit passengers and procure freight. He
sold no tickets but took prepaid orders for tickets to be delivered
in Chicago. Although the court held that this was not sufficient
to Igive Iennsylvania jurisdiction, nevertheless it was said, "It
is obvious that the defendant was doing there a considerable
1,usinss of a certain kind. . . . "311(Italics supplied).
The writer believes that "doing business" is an unsatisfactory test for determining jurisdiction. As the above cases indi-ate, the phrase does not have sufficiently definite legal meaning, to make for any degree of uniformity. While the test cannot be and should not be too precise, it should be stated in terms
that have fairly definite legal connotations. The rule might well
be expressed in terms of what is reasonable under the circumstances. If a corpo'ation comes into a state and does an act or
F. (2d) 139 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930).
Wilson Packing Co. v. Hunter, 30 Fed. Cas. 253, No. 17, 852
(S. D. Ill., 1879).
'Green v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railway Co., 205
U. S. 530 at 533 (1907).
-'45
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acts which can reasonably be said to affect its business, it should
be considered present for service in causes of action arising uit
of 'that act or those acts. This is subject, of course, to the requirements of due process.
This rule differs little, if at all, from the one embodied in
the non-resident motorist statutes. Such statutes are based on
the theovy that the individual has come into the state and don
an act and that it is necessary for the protection of local citizens
that he continue subject to service in actions arising out of that
act, even though he has since left the state. 3'
The writer believes that there is no sound distinction between the non-resident motorist who has come into the state and
done an act and a foreign corporation that has come in and done
an act reasonably affecting its business. The need for protection
is as great in one case as in the other and there is no logical reason why jurisdiction should exist in the one and not in the other.
The much discussed case of Doherty & Company v. Goodmn :1-'
adopted the "doing of an act" theory in the case of a non-reident individual who through an agent went into a state and sold
securities. This decision can be extended by an easy and logi4al
step to include foreig'n corporations. Actually tho statute involved included non-resident corporations and there is no reason to believe that if the defendant in the case had been su.h.
the decision would not have been the same.
The "doing of business" theory was originated for the
purpose of obtaining jurisdiction over foreign corporations.
The "doing of an act" theory, an extension of the original
theory, has only been applied to individuals up to this date. If
the extension should ultimately be applied to foreign corporations, the circle will have been completed. The slow but steadyN
growth of the law is the result of such extensions.
ROSANNA

1

-ess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 (1927).
294 U. S. 623 (1935).
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